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OPNAV N09X asked the Center for Defense Management Reform (CDMR) to 
explore the link between performance and resource allocation in the Navy 
enterprise. This is a report of a study conducted of the Surface Warfare Enterprise 
(SWE) in the summer of 2008 to assess how resource allocation decisions are 
made, how readiness (performance) is measured and reported, how well the SWE is 
linking the two, and to identify hurdles and enablers for success. 
Performance-based management systems (PBMS) provide a framework to 
help organizations achieve desired outcomes by measuring and evaluating its 
efficiency and effectiveness. We looked at the SWE through a PBMS framework and 
provide five findings with associated recommendations: 
x The SWE understands there are both political and economic elements to 
performance management in the public sector and is taking appropriate 
steps to manage both. To be most successful, political influence strategies 
should employ tactics and information beyond what the enterprise’s own 
performance management system generates. 
x There is commendable discipline in data collection and documentation 
processes, which should continue. Communicating performance should be 
more precise, however. Specifically, the concepts of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness are co-mingled when they should be distinct. 
x The enterprise has developed many measures of readiness and proxies for 
readiness. Attention should now shift to evaluating the efficacy of those 
measures. It is likely there is more data captured and displayed than is 
useful and the enterprise should limit the number of measures to those that 
convey the most information, that is, those that are the most useful for 
decision-making.
x Data quality plagues most large, complex organizations and the Navy is no 
different. We recommend the measures used by decision-makers 
acknowledge the degree of uncertainty in the data. We recommend the 
enterprise continue efforts to clean databases. We further recommend Navy 
Enterprise link their performance measurement efforts with the Navy’s 
financial management improvement efforts to construct cost accounting 
capabilities that will augment existing budgetary accounting systems. 
x Since most public sector outcomes are subjective, we recommend the 
enterprise consider the use of more subjective measures, particularly when 






Mapping objective measures to subjective measures in a manner that 
shows causal relationships will keep the effort focused and will support 
budgetary requests. 
In summary, the Surface Warfare Enterprise has laid a solid foundation for 
their performance-based management system. They have an accurate self-
assessment of many of its strengths and weaknesses. We encourage them to 
continue on the path they are on with attention shifting in the few key areas noted 
above. Within the report are specific examples of SWE products, examples of 
successful performance management systems from other government entities which 
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OPNAV N09X asked the Center for Defense Management Reform (CDMR) to 
explore the link between performance and resource allocation in the Navy 
enterprise. This is a report of a study conducted of the Surface Warfare Enterprise 
(SWE) in the summer of 2008 to assess how resource allocation decisions are 
made, how readiness (performance) is measured and reported, how well the SWE is 
linking the two, and to identify hurdles and enablers for success. 
Background 
Since at least the Hoover Commission in 1947, the federal government has 
sought better ways to measure its performance and to allocate resources in a 
manner that increases the overall performance of government. Over the past 60 
years, government organizations have used various performance-based 
management systems (PBMS) to attempt to link resources with results.1  In one way 
or another, nearly all PBMS stress a set of measures and goals, based on a logical 
flow from strategy through metrics to evaluation (and back through in the opposite 
direction), that ultimately focuses on results or outcomes, and how to achieve those 
results or outcomes in a cost-effective manner. PBMS is the subject of the next 
section of the report. 
In practice, government organizations have found it extremely difficult to 
connect outputs and outcomes to resources.  With each new PBMS (or 
transformation), the federal government attempted to use a performance basis for 
allocating resources across agencies.  Agencies then sought performance bases for 
                                           
1 The efforts by Navy Enterprise follow in a long path of attempts to link performance to budgets.  
Past attempts, which have had varying degrees of successes, include planning-programming-
budgeting (PPBS) in the 1960s, management by objectives (MBO) in the early 1970s, zero-based 
budgeting (ZBB) in the late 1970s and 1980s, GPRA and the performance movement of the 1990s 






allocating across functions or across departments within agencies. With enterprise-
wide information systems and standard, repeatable business processes, agencies 
increased their ability to measure consistently. Transformational change through 
better understanding of the agency, however, does not come simply from faster and 
more reliable data.  Timely and reliable data exist only to support improved decision-
making; thus, data need to be linked to improved processes. Change needs to occur 
in the business processes and the culture of the organization in which those 
processes occur and that those data describe.  Navy Enterprise is an attempt to 
make such transformational change. From the Navy Enterprise website: 
“Navy Enterprise is about improving the return on investment in all that 
we do. It is about managing initiatives to guarantee the appropriate 
balance between efficiency and risk. It is about becoming more 
innovative in our strategy and processes to counter balance the 
growing financial challenges we face. Navy Enterprise is about 
maximizing our resources and continuing to effectively deliver combat 
ready maritime forces to joint commanders now and in the future—it's 
about achieving the objectives identified in our new Maritime 
Strategy.”
The Navy has made critical strides towards collecting consistent and timely 
data.  The next steps will be to ensure the data can be analyzed and used to 
manage resources more efficiently and effectively.  Accordingly, we sought to (a) 
understand the existing relationship between organizational performance and 
resource allocation within a subset of Navy Enterprise and (b) provide 
recommendations based on studies of performance management and performance-
based budgeting in the academic and practitioner literature. Specific research 
questions included: 
 How do managers make resource allocation decisions? 
 How is readiness measured and reported? 
 How is readiness reporting linked to financial resources? 
 What are the critical enablers and hurdles to successful integration of 






 What lessons can be taken from studies of successful performance 
based management systems? 
Methods
We employed a case-based research design, informed by scholarly and 
practitioner literature on performance-based management. Case-based research is 
common in public administration, the social sciences, and business research and is 
particularly useful when: 
 the research questions are in the form of “why” or “how” 
 the research subject is a complex phenomenon 
 the phenomenon is unique and contemporary 
 the study does not require experimental control.2
All factors were applicable to this study. The Surface Warfare Enterprise 
(hereafter, SWE) was chosen due to its relative maturity among the warfare 
enterprises. It has been working this question for a while, but has not 
institutionalized its practices yet. The potential to use the findings appeared greatest. 
We reviewed scores of briefings, documents, meeting minutes and other 
archival information on the SWE Intranet. We conducted about twenty-five hours of 
interviews with members of the enterprise, representing cross-functional teams, 
class squadrons, and contractor support. We reviewed academic and practitioner 
studies of performance-based management systems. And we reviewed promising 
practices3 in other government activities whose experience may benefit Navy 
Enterprise.
                                           
2 Robert K. Yin. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage).
3 Many would have used the term “best practices” here, but since the concept of “best” is context-
specific, best practices cannot be exported to another context and still be expected to be best. 






We did not attempt to evaluate the readiness of the surface force, nor did we 
attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the use of financial resources. We also did 
not evaluate whether there were enough resources. Rather, we evaluated the 
processes used to measure performance and the processes used to allocate 
resources with an aim to improve those processes. 
Benefits of the Study 
The primary benefit of this study is educational. The Naval Enterprise initiative 
is vast and encompasses virtually all of the Navy’s organizations and processes so 
successful practices in one domain may not be made available to others. Knowledge 
management is difficult in large organizations. The primary benefit of this study is the 
combination of lessons from evaluating current practices inside the Navy, evaluating 
practices outside the DoD, and the ultimate transfer of that information through the 
enterprise. This report, then, is structured to be more informational than evaluative. 
In addition to this report, we are preparing a teaching case study that will be 
available for use in the Naval Postgraduate School’s defense-focused MBA 
program, the Navy’s Center for Executive Education, and the Defense Resources 
Management Institute. The findings and recommendations in this report will be used 
to educate future naval leaders. 
Limitations of the Study 
We covered only one warfare enterprise so the findings may not be fully 
applicable to the other warfare enterprises. Applicability is a function of the other 
enterprises’ approaches to performance management and the level of maturity of 
their processes. We also emphasized current operations and current readiness. 
More work was done in this domain by the SWE than expected, and that limited the 
researchers’ time to explore the SWE’s role in modernization or personnel 
management. Thus, the findings are more appropriate for matters affecting current, 






the readiness data collection and reporting resulted in a bias toward the analysis of 
operations and maintenance (O&M) spending. The SWE financial footprint is 
significantly larger, especially when one considers the surface warfare portion of 
provider enterprise activities (viz., manpower and acquisition spending). Future 
studies should consider these larger accounts to get a more complete picture of the 
financial resources devoted to surface warfare readiness. 
Structure of the Report 
This report is arranged in two major sections. The first describes generally the 
concept of performance-based management systems and applies that concept to 
the SWE. This foundation is necessary to establish as the findings and 
recommendations are grounded in that framework. The second section is organized 
around six major findings; each finding is described, as are its consequence or 
importance, our recommendations for improvement, and additional information the 
enterprise may find helpful. Two appendixes summarize those recommendations 












Performance-based Management Systems 
Overview 
Performance management, by one definition, is the systematic process by 
which an agency involves its employees in improving organizational effectiveness in 
the accomplishment of agency mission and goals.  Rather than focusing on inputs 
and work being done, which is what government agencies have traditionally done, 
PBMS provide a framework to help an organization achieve desired outcomes and 
push managers to measure and examine results.  Recent research summarizes the 
set of performance management challenges faced by any government manager: to 
improve effectiveness, focusing on how well desired outcomes are achieved; to 
improve efficiency, focusing on how well the costs of producing goods and services 
are managed and, to improve accountability, focusing on bringing together budgets 
and performance measures. 4 In addition, public sector managers use performance 
management to help them tackle a set of specific managerial issues including 
evaluation and feedback.5  In this section we define inputs, outputs and other terms 
needed to discuss a government organization’s ability to measure and evaluate 
performance.
Critical Terminology 
At the heart of PBMS lie two essential concepts: effectiveness and efficiency.
To correctly measure performance and fund in line with priorities requires 
                                           
4 Melese, F., Blandin, J., & O'Keefe, S. (2004) “A New Management Model for Government: 
Integrating Activity Based Costing (ABC), the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), and Total Quality 
Management (TQM) with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS),” International 
Public Management Review, 5(2): 103-131. 
5 See, for example, Robert D. Behn (2003) “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require 
Different Measures,” Public Administration Review 63(5): 586-606.; Steven J. Kelman (2006) “Public 
Management Needs Help!” International Public Management Review. 7(1): 1-5.; and  Theodore H. 
Poister (2003) Measuring Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations (San Francisco: John 






understanding the connections among an organization’s goals and its resources 
allocation processes.  Desirable metrics flow from the goals and show whether a 
program or organization is effective and efficient.  Measuring efficiency and 
effectiveness, however, requires bridging two separate perspectives of an 
organization.
On the one hand, managers want to know whether an organization or 
program is effective. Effectiveness measures describe how well a program or 
organization achieves a strategic goal; they are the outcomes – the results or 
consequences of direct importance to program customers or the public.  For 
example, “customer satisfaction,” “winning the war” or “being well-educated” are 
outcomes.  Effectiveness measures come from the right-hand side of the model in 
Figure 1: 
Figure 1: Resource Allocation to Outcomes 
On the other hand, budgeting processes by their nature focus on inputs (line 
items and appropriations).  Organizations use their funding to buy inputs (resources 
used, e.g., labor, equipment, etc.) to produce an output, which we define as the 
completed product of internal activity or work done within the organization or by its 
contractors (hours steamed, flight hours, numbers of jobs done by Seabees, etc.).
To manage well requires understanding the outputs and being able to measure 
them.  We ask organizations to be efficient – to use the fewest inputs at the 
minimum cost necessary to produce a certain amount of output. Measures of 
efficiency describe how well an organization uses inputs to produce outputs.
In contrast to the examples of outcomes from the previous paragraph (“customer 
satisfaction,” “winning the war” or “being well-educated”), corresponding output 
measures might be providing meals, readiness, or classes that, when properly 






provided (in a timely manner, of a certain quality, meeting certain standards, etc.), 
can result in desired outcomes. 6
Outputs and outcomes can be difficult to identify and assess.  Rather than 
being natural measures (those with common interpretation, such as dollars to 
measure cost), we often use proxy measures.  Proxies do not directly measure 
performance, but are related to what we want to assess.  Consider the issue of 
public safety.  Typical measures used to assess public safety include rates for 
murder, rape, robbery, and the like.  These, however, are outputs – they serve as 
proxies for the desirable outcome of “a safe neighborhood” or “a safe city.”  Even 
assessing how members of the public feel about their safety, an outcome measure, 
can be problematic; while this is the outcome desired by many, if crimes are not 
reported to the public or are sensationalized in the media, accuracy of responses to 
surveys will not reflect whether safety is “better” or “worse” over some time period. 
In some instances, the difficulty in measuring performance forces us to assign 
or construct measures to describe different levels of performance.  For example, 
when assessing activity limitations in daily living, the National Health Interview 
Survey assesses a long-term reduction in a person’s capacity to perform the 
average kind or amount of activities associated with his or her age group.  People 
are classified into one of four categories: 
1. unable to perform the major activity,
2. able to perform the major activity but limited in the kind or amount of 
this activity,
3. not limited in the major activity but limited in the kind or amount of 
other activities, and
                                           
6 Outcomes definitions adapted from Harry P. Hatry (2001) “What performance measures should be 
tracked?” in Dall W. Forsythe, ed  Quicker, Better, Cheaper: Managing Performance in American 






4. not limited in any way.  
Measures such as these have direct applications in defense, where outcomes 
often have no natural or easily determined proxy measure. 
In addition, one’s definition or view of performance depends on one’s 
responsibilities, or “where you sit.”  For example, a rescue mission may have more 
than one end outcome; a rescue may save a life, save equipment, and constitute a 
“win” for an organization.  In the process of preparing for and attaining the outcomes, 
the organization may measure other things thought to increase the probability of 
success in performing rescues.  For example, the organization may perform drills, 
measuring the time it takes to instigate the rescue process.  It may perform safety 
and other quality repairs and drills to be prepared to undertake rescues.  These 
actions, whether defined as outputs or intermediate outcomes, are thought to be 
predecessors to success in achieving the organization’s higher-level goals. 
In summary, care must be taken both in the definition and construction of 
metrics to assess output and outcome. Outputs reflect the product of work or activity 
and outcomes are results, accomplishments, effects or impacts. When applied to 
government situations, it often becomes necessary to use outputs as proxies for 


















The rational world of efficiency
The political world of public choice
The less rational world of 
budgeting


















Figure 2: Performance Based Management Framework 
A Framework for Performance-based Management 
Using the terms we have defined, we now move to Figure 2, which illustrates 
the framework we used to examine SWE performance. At the center of Figure 2,
inputs are transformed by activities into outputs.  This is what we call the “rational 
world of efficiency,” and results in measures of efficiency useful for internal planning, 
motivation and control.
The framework also shows the differences among the terms budgeting, 
inputs, outputs and efficiency: without a direct connection from expenditure on inputs 
to outputs produced, efficiency cannot be measured.  Additionally, in the “less 
rational world of budgeting,” many factors related to budget authority affect the use 






Outcomes, or those results, effects, or accomplishments that happen when 
the organization uses an output towards achievement of a goal, depend on external 
factors and human preferences and behavior.  We refer to this as the “uncertain 
world of effectiveness.”
Finally, environmental factors outside control of the organization’s leadership 
affect all stages of organizational performance, including whether this particular 
value stream is the preferred means to attain the desired outcome.  We call this the 
“political world of public choice.”  A specific example shown as Figure 3 can help 
clarify:
$150         Gas
$30           Oil
$300      Tires
$100     Labor
Performance Based Management Framework
How can I increase fuel efficiency?
What if I took the bus or a taxi instead?
How much should I budget for 
gas?
How much do my car and my 





























In this example, assume transportation will be by private car.  The budget 
includes money to buy inputs such as gasoline, oil, tires and labor expenses.  
Suppose the car gets 25 miles per gallon (mpg), our monthly gasoline budget is 
$150 and gasoline costs $3 per gallon.  All other things held constant, we can buy 
50 gallons of gasoline and drive 1250 miles in the month.  Fuel efficiency of the car 
is 25 mpg, and the more typically used unit cost measure of efficiency is 
$150/1250=$0.12 per mile. Miles driven represents the output (although other 
measures, such as trips taken, are possible).
In the rational world of efficiency, the question is, “How can I increase fuel 
efficiency?”  Perhaps filling the tires with more air will help.  Perhaps changing the oil 
or getting a tune-up will help.  Driving a steady speed and accelerating gradually 
also improve fuel efficiency.  This question involves process improvement, where 
changes in the mix of inputs, increases in technology and training, and other ways to 
“lean” the process result in improvement. 
In the less rational world of budgeting, we face the more difficult question of 
“How much should I budget for gas?”  If gasoline goes to $4 per gallon, with the 
same budget we buy 37.5 gallons and drive 937.5 miles.  Fuel efficiency is still 25 
mpg, but the unit cost measure of efficiency changes to $150/937.5=$0.16.  Another 
possibility is to fund to the same workload, costing $200.  Fuel efficiency remains at 
25 mpg and unit cost efficiency again is $200/1250=$0.16.  For next month, should 
we budget $0.12, $0.16 or another figure per mile driven?  As one might suspect, 
prices of inputs and the amount of the output affect the answer.  How much work we 
plan to do, and at what prices, should help determine the amount of budget for each 
input, NOT the amount spent this year.  These measures also highlight the difficulty 
in measuring efficiency. 
Note that this relationship separates budget from output: increasing the 






the outcome. Similarly, it is probably impossible to derive a unit-of-readiness-per-
dollar measure that is accurate and appropriate for budgeting. 
Outcome depends not only on how many miles we can drive, but whether we 
get where we want to go in a timely manner.  Many other factors affect the outcome 
including the age of the car, our schedule, the need to have flexibility to come and 
go as needed, traffic, weather, and road conditions, and other factors out of the 
driver’s control.  It is also situational: deciding whether to drive back and forth to 
work in Monterey, California is quite different from deciding whether to drive in 
Bangkok or Mexico City, where two-hours traffic jams occur on a regular basis, and 
driving to work in a metropolitan area when one works third shift may be quite 
different than driving for a 9 to 5 job. 
Figure 4 shows the same relationships as the car example using possible 
















The world of MFOM and TFOM
Other services, or Navy communities competing for missions
The amount obligated or 
available to buy resources
Do the outputs generate a 
ready ship?
















Figure 4: SWE Performance Based Management Framework 
Impediments to successful performance management 
We would be remiss if we did not point out a few terms that should be used 
extremely carefully or should not be used at all in reference to performance 
measurement (due to the likelihood that they misconstrue proper indicators of 
performance) and a few concepts that should guide both our choice of performance 
management systems and measures and the way we communicate them.
Terms
 The term, “cost,” a sacrifice of resources, may be an outlay cost (past, 
present or future cash flow) or an opportunity cost (foregone alternative 
benefit).  Cost, expenditure and inputs often refer to different things.
Strictly speaking, only the cost of inputs used in production of the 






without robust accounting systems (such as activity-based costing) to 
tie input costs to specific outputs, we cannot precisely measure 
efficiency.  Without connecting input costs to outputs, we have no 
possibility, except at the most rudimentary, macro level, to connect 
costs to outcomes.
 The overused term return on investment (ROI) applies to 
investments, not expenses.  In DOD, ROI should help guide 
investment decisions (e.g., buying a new ship), but is not an 
appropriate measure to help manage operating expenses (e.g., 
operating the ship we already have).
Concepts
 Some basic concepts cover the key points in choosing useful 
performance measures.  First is to focus on those measures 
connected to strategic goals that also show a clear relationship 
between the outcome and the measure.  Where possible, measures 
should be direct; for example, in measuring job safety, percent 
compliance with safety guidelines is an indirect measure, while number 
of worker injuries is direct.  Measures should be comprehensive, and 
operational.  If values are not relatively easy to measure, practical to 
implement or observe, and relatively easy to interpret, they will not be 
used to drive action towards the achievement of the most important 
strategic goals. 
 “Metric mania,” a condition in which the sheer number and 
disorganization of metrics makes evaluating, comprehension and 
accountability problematic, should be avoided.7   In most organizations, 
many things are measured that have no direct tie to the success of the 
organization.  Inputs, activities, tasks, and work may be important to 
measure if they contribute to achieving results; however, by 
themselves, they provide little to no value.8  An organization must 
focus on measuring output and outcomes to effectively manage 
performance and meet the organization’s goals.9
 The concept of sub-optimal behavior applies to performance 
                                           
7 See, for example, W. Casey, W. Peck, N.J. Webb, & P. Quast, (In press) “Are we driving strategic 
results or metric mania?” International Public Management Review.
8 See, for example, Behn (2003) and Harry P. Hatry (1999) "Mini-Symposium on Intergovernmental 
Comparative Performance Data." Public Administration Review 59(2): 101-4.   






management when it is done at multiple levels of an 
organization.  Using performance-based measures can result in 
sub-optimizing behavior if goals do not support higher-tier goals.  
Without a broader view, each smaller organization can perform 
effectively and efficiently, but may not be effective or efficient 
from the perspective of the Navy as a whole if there is 
redundancy in activities or organizations focused on lower-tier 
goals that do not contribute to goals of the larger enterprise.
 Finally, some of the difficulties in implementing performance 
management in government stem from several basic
differences between private and public organizations.  Two 
of these are the ability to measure the product or output of work, 
and the control managers have over inputs into the processes 
needed to create outputs and results.  Figure 5 shows the 
relationship among private, nonprofit, and government 
organizations in working with inputs and outputs. 10
As this figure shows, government organizations tend to have the least ability 
to measure what they do, and less direct control over inputs used to do the work.
Because of this, the quality and efficacy of the performance management system 
cannot be as robust – simply put, the Navy cannot do performance management as 
well as Toyota. 
                                           
10 Peter Frumpkin & Joseph Galaskiewicz (2004) “Institutional Isomorphism and Public Sector 






Figure 5: Relationships among private, nonprofit and government 
organizations in the ability to measure outputs and control inputs 
Conclusion 
What, then, can an organization do to begin to tie performance to budgets?
First, it should provide a clear understanding of what it means to be efficient and 
effective, and an understanding of the cause and effect relationships modeled in 
Figure 1.  Second, the organization can help their personnel and other stakeholders 
understand the factors affecting program or organizational performance.  And not all 
the factors are related to resources: it is necessary to be absolutely clear about what 
can be “controlled” by resources and what cannot.  In the absence of performance 
measurement and accounting systems that connect performance and levels of 
funding, managers can concentrate only where activities, outputs, and outcomes are 
reasonably associated with and responsive to funding levels.  An analysis of 
performance and resource allocation activities in one organization can shed insights 
on how and where to link budgets to performance.  At the end of the day, of course, 






we doing things right?” (efficiency) should drive all discussion of performance 
management and measurement.
Findings and Recommendations 
Our evaluation of the SWE, examined through the lens of performance-based 
management, resulted in five findings. Each finding has several recommendations 
for improvement. A finding should not necessarily be considered a negative thing; 
some findings are quite positive where others are neutral. All are presented in a 
manner we believe will add value to the SWE and the broader naval enterprise. 
The findings come from the fields of economics, knowledge management or 
decision science.  In them, we address the quality of data, the effectiveness of the 
measures the data support, the breadth and type of measures, the way they are 
communicated, and the decision-making processes they support.
Finding 1: Balance political and rational means to your ends 
Description
Performance-based management systems must deal with two fundamental 
types of issues, the rational economic ones and the less rational political ones. The 
SWE is taking appropriate steps to manage both through its metrics efforts and its 
influence strategies. They have mapped all the financial resources that directly or 
indirectly support their desired outcomes and have identified the organizational 
entities responsible for those resources. See Figure 6. Because the SWE chief 
executive does not directly control most of these resources, the enterprise is 
developing an influence strategy.  
The strategy recognizes the political basis of decision-making. Political, in this 
context, is not derogatory; it simply refers to any group decision-making process in 






based partly in power and partly in coalitions.11 The SWE is basing its strategy on the 
critical interorganizational relationships and the processes embedded in the Navy’s 
resource allocation system. The newly established CFO, staffed with an SES, is an 
appropriately placed rank to fulfill the role of exerting influence on the supporting 
organizations and processes. 
Figure 6: SWE Financial Resources 
Consequence 
There has long been a desire among government managers and budgeters to 
find a rational basis for the allocation of resources. Going back nearly 70 years, V.O. 
Key raised the question, “On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to 
                                           







activity A instead of activity B?”12  While a microeconomist would say one should put 
the next marginal dollar on the activity that generates the most marginal utility, doing 
so in practice is difficult. Key noted that, “The doctrine of marginal utility, developed 
most finely in the analysis of the market economy, has a ring of unreality when 
applied to public expenditures.” In the end, Key acknowledged it is a fundamentally 
political decision. Public budgeting research has since failed to prove Key wrong. 
In fact, recent research shows that budget allocation decisions by 
legislatures, for example, are not influenced by agency-generated performance 
information.13 However, research also shows that performance information is very 
useful for internal agency management.14 Insofar as the organization finds the 
performance information useful for day-to-day management of the activities, it is 
valuable and should continue. The organization should also understand that the 
political decision-making process discounts such information and relies on other 
factors. Thus, it is appropriate for the warfare enterprises to gather performance 
information in their role as managers and stewards of military capabilities; they are 
cautioned, however, not to expect that same information to drive resource allocation 
decisions outside their sphere of direct control. Tools of political influence are most 
effective for those matters. 
Recommendations
Continue to apply political solutions to the political world and apply economic 
ones to the rational world. That is, in the PBMS framework, focus your influence 
                                           
12 Key, V. O. (1940). The Lack of a Budgetary Theory. The American Political Science Review, 34 (6): 
1137-1144 
13 Carolyn Bordeaux (2008) “Integrating Performance Information into Legislative Budget Processes,” 
Public Performance & Management Review 31(4): 547-569. 
14  See, for example, Gerald Miller, W. Bartley Hildreth, and Jack Rabin, eds. (2001) Performance-
based Budgeting (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) or Carolyn J. Heinrich & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. 







strategies on the budgeting portion (linking dollars to inputs) and the overall choice 
(linking SWE-associated dollars to desired outcomes). Influence strategies should 
certainly include bringing to bear the evidence from performance measurement, but 
augment that line of reasoning with other tactics. Budgeting decisions are influenced 
more by external validations of performance than by a program’s self-reported 
claims, so use external evidence when available. Information generated by a 
decision-maker’s staff is more influential than information generated externally, so 
employ that information when available. Most importantly, the decision-maker’s 
personal experience affects budgeting decisions, so influence strategies should be 
personalized.
While influence strategies contend with the political and less rational 
relationships in the PBMS, the enterprise should focus its measurement, evaluation, 
and efficiency-seeking efforts in the more rational relationships between inputs, 
activities, and outputs. This is where efficiency-seeking initiatives (e.g, Lean Six 
Sigma proposals) will have the greatest and most certain effect. Given the 
uncertainty of the political aspects of resource allocation decision-making, the 
rational processes should make allowance for that uncertainty. 
Additional Information 
 The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective by J. Pfeffer & G. R. Salancik 
 Creating Public Value by Mark Moore
 Performance Budgeting: Efforts to Restructure Budgets to Better Align 
Resources with Performance GAO Staff Study (GAO-05-117SP), 
February 2005 
 Linking Performance and Budgeting: Opportunities in the Federal 
Budget Process by Philip Joyce, IBM Center for the Business of 
Government, October 2003. 







Finding 2: Extend process discipline to communications 
Description.
There is commendable discipline in certain processes, particularly in data 
collection and documentation. There is a formalized process for documenting the 
bases for measurement including definitions, sources, manipulations, presentations, 
and responsible individuals. This practice, while administratively burdensome, is 
essential to a repeatable, verifiable process. Given the rate of personnel turnover, 
this practice will sustain reform momentum. 
In other areas – particularly in communicating performance – there is less 
discipline. The most notable is that cost and spending are often used 
interchangeably yet there are significant differences between these concepts. Figure 
7, for example, is taken from an enterprise presentation.
Figure 7: Communication Example 
The top of the figure shows the basic organizational process of converting 
inputs to outputs through some transformational activity, but the chart, which is 
intended to display the concept of productivity, falls short of its goal.  The vertical 
axis is labeled, “Input: $ Spending” inferring this is the budget authority used and not 
the inputs acquired with that budget authority.  The horizontal axis is labeled, 






cost control. Having a dollar sign on the vertical axis and cost on the horizontal could 
lead one to believe this depicts changing prices of inputs.  To illustrate productivity, a 
better chart would eliminate the qualifiers on both axis labels and simply plot inputs 
against outputs.
The curve on the slide is notional, but implies a relationship. Unless one 
actually evaluates a given input:output pair, one does not know whether the line is 
concave, convex, or a step function. It may be bounded, or it might even be 
horizontal or vertical if there is not a clear relationship. Presuming a particular shape 
could lead to suboptimal decisions.  
The text to the right is also misleading. Management may have no control 
over the price of inputs and thus does not have the power to move the organization 
as indicated. (Recall the discussion of the automobile in the previous section.) They 
can affect the ratio of inputs to outputs through efficiency efforts, but not necessarily 
dollars to outputs. For example, you may be able to reduce the labor hours to 
perform a task, but you have no control over the pay raise that Congress will enact.
Consequence 
By focusing on the amount of spending relative to a unit of output, the 
analysis is confounded by both price effects and program effects. The enterprise 
managers have control over the program effects, but often not the price effects. 
Even when they do have control over the price effects (negotiating terms of a 
contract, for example), the contracting process is still a separate activity from the 
process that converts the input to an output.
The issue is most pronounced at the fiscal year transition. To illustrate the 
consequence of miscommunication, let us assume that the enterprise receives 
windfall funding late in the fiscal year. The funds are obligated on spare parts to fill 
storerooms on ships. That practice is sound, but that spending is not a cost to the 






start of the second year. The organization simply converted one asset (budget 
authority) into another asset (repair parts). It is not until the asset is consumed in 
some activity (maintenance) that a cost is incurred.
Recommendations
Focus efficiency efforts on the relationship between inputs consumed and 
outputs generated, not on the dollars spent. This means tracking labor hours instead 
of labor dollars. It means tracking parts consumed, not the obligation of funds for 
parts. Productivity or efficiency is in that relationship. Linking the acquisition or use 
of inputs to the funds obligated for them is a different analysis, a cash flow analysis; 
it is not an efficiency concern. The discussion in finding #4 on cost accounting is 
related.
When communicating the success or challenges of the enterprise in a 
budgeting environment, be certain to separate the two effects: price concerns and 
programmatic needs. 
Additional Information 
 “Linking Performance to Funding Decisions: What is the Budgeter’s 
Role?” by Gloria Grizzle, appears in Public Productivity and 
Management Review.
 Performance-based Budgeting by Gerald Miller, W. Bartley Hildreth, 
and Jack Rabin 
 Visual and Statistical Thinking: Displays of Evidence for Decision 
Making by Edward Tufte 
Finding 3: Evaluate the effectiveness of the measures 
Description.
While the data are well defined, the role of data in SWE decision support is 
not as well defined. Finding 2 noted the quality of documentation and within the 






behavior?” and “How does the chart contribute to improving warship readiness?” 
Too often, however, these were answered with general statements about leadership 
probing the issue and taking action. Specific actions, and the triggers that require 
such action, are not specified.
In other cases data were arranged in ways that provided ambiguous 
information that is not effective for decision-making.  The field of knowledge 
management tells us that data, such as a specific measurement of a component of 
readiness or the status of funds, become information in a given context. Information, 
in turn, provides meaning and context for action. Knowledge enables that action. A 
knowledgeable person can make good decisions and act only in the presence of 
appropriate information that is based on appropriate data.15 It is important that the 
enterprise convert data into meaningful management information. We illustrate with 
an example; see Figure 8.
                                           
15 Mark E. Nissen (2006) Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics: Principled Organizational Knowing & 






Figure 8: Sample Bridgeplot 
This chart displays a measure of ships’ material condition against spending. 
Looking more closely, we see the bars represent the number of ships whose 
material condition (MFOM = maintenance figure of merit) is such that they are 
deemed “ready” or “not ready.” A small number of ships had no data available and 
other ships were in shipyard availability periods and so MFOM is not currently 
meaningful. The bars are not point descriptions, but rather 12 month rolling 
averages. The lines on the chart represent planned obligations of budget authority 
(triangles) and actual cumulative obligations (squares). At the transition of fiscal 
year, the lines were connected so that the portion of the line prior to October 2007 
represented fiscal year 2007 funds and the portion after represent fiscal year 2008 
funds.
What information does this chart convey? Looking at the stacked bars, one 






period (presumably not a good thing), the number of ships with no data is nearly 
zero (presumably a good thing), and the number of ships in availability has 
increased (unknown whether this is good or not). As a 12-month rolling average, one 
does not know the current status of the fleet, just the trend over the last year. 
Looking at the lines, one sees the planned spending line is a step function at fiscal 
quarter intervals, inferring this is actually depicting allocated funding and not planned 
obligations. One also sees that the amount of funds dropped to zero and began 
climbing again. This, of course, is due to the change in fiscal year, but by linking the 
FY07 line to the FY08 line, it looks like a single account, not two different accounts. 
Since the bars and lines are portrayed together, there is a presumed relationship, 
but the chart depicts a rolling average of maintenance (an evaluation measure) 
against current status of funds (a control measure). It is unclear from the chart what 
decisions this should drive.






Consider another example; see Figure 9. The enterprise is responsible for the 
readiness of its warships and readiness is said to have several components. The 
SWE defines readiness as a function of personnel, equipment, supply, training and 
ordnance, commonly referred to as the PESTO pillars. This is consistent with the 
logic underlying the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). Data are 
collected along these five pillars. Cross-functional teams tend to concentrate on the 
health of the fleet within one or more of those pillars. The class squadrons look at 
the health of the ships across the pillars.  Figure 9 is a chart used by one of the class 
squadrons to assess the effect of staffing on ship readiness. We see the chart is 
arranged by the DRRS structure of missions the ships may be tasked to perform. 
Under each mission area are training figures of merit (TFOM) and manning data.
There are some concerns with Figure 9.  First, the second column from the 
left after the unit identification is all red. There are three other columns that are 
nearly all red. If an indicator is red for all units one should question whether the 
stoplight scheme is miscalibrated since it is unlikely that all ships are not ready. The 
tolerance for the red designation may need to be adjusted. There is another danger 
with stoplight coding of measures. Depending how that measure is used, there are 
incentives for suboptimal allocation of resources. Taking a simple example, if there 
are two areas of deficiency, one scored at 82 and the other at 89 and both are coded 
blue, there is an incentive to correct the 89 deficiency before the worse 82 deficiency 
because the 89 will improve its characterization (turn green) with a one point gain; 
the 82 requires an eight point gain. The color scheme perversely leads one to 
correct the better area before the worse area.
It should be mentioned that during this study two surface ships scored poorly 
on their inspections by the Board of Inspections and Surveys (INSURV). The SWE 
embarked on a “redline” effort to understand how well their performance 
measurement system does or does not predict or record poor performance. Such an 






effort was prompted by an unfortunate event, it is characteristic of the type of 
evaluation of measures that should be done routinely.
Consequence 
Generally speaking, there are several reasons why performance should be 
measured. Performance may be measured to evaluate how well the organization is 
doing, to control critical processes, to base resource allocation decisions, to learn 
what is working and what is not, to motivate managers and employees, or to 
promote the success and value of the organization. (Many of those are actually 
intermediate purposes for measurement; the ultimate goal being improved 
performance.) The selection and presentation of measures should be based upon 
one of those reasons: evaluation, control, allocation, learning, motivation, or 
promotion.16
No one set of measures will serve all purposes. Managers should look at their 
specific goals, responsibilities, and decisions and select that set of measures that 
best supports their work. For purposes of evaluation, measures should assess 
outcomes in manner that is comparable against some standard (e.g., manning vs 
allowance). For purposes of control, measures should assess inputs that are 
regulated (e.g., budget authority or FTE). For purposes of allocation, measures 
should be based on efficiency (outputs or outcomes divided by inputs). Learning 
measures should uncover deviances from what is expected; motivational measures 
should compare real-time actual performance with targets; and promotion should 
illuminate aspects of performance that is most important to stakeholders.17
Using the wrong type of measure could lead to suboptimal decisions and 
lower performance. Returning to our example, Figure 8 mixes an evaluative 
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measure (readiness) with a control measure (spending rate), but not in a fashion that 
shows how the control affects the object being evaluated. 
Lastly, it is very important that measures reflect desired outcomes. If the 
measures are not driving action that affects outcomes, then the system is not 
working effectively. To get to that point requires a mapping of the causal 
relationships between inputs and outputs, outputs and outcomes.
Recommendations
The SWE has established a large set of measures and has some experience 
working with them in different ways. There exists a significant experiential baseline. 
At this stage, the key users and generators of the information should shift attention 
to the usefulness and quality of the measures. Ask, “Do the data convey information 
that, given a decision-maker’s role and experience, enables him/her to make better 
decisions?” Just as we have described the chart above, conduct similar analyses of 
other displays of data to assess the quality of the information. Discard measures that 
are not useful or modify them so that they are. 
Consider the actions a particular measure intends to drive and ask how best 
to characterize that measure to induce the proper action. The hierarchy of data-
information-knowledge described earlier actually flows in both directions. One can 
collect and assemble data, put it in context to create information that, combined with 
experience, enables action. But, only by tapping one’s knowledge will one know 
whether information is useful and in turn what data should be collected. Thus, 
evaluation of the measures should be conducted in both directions. First, ask who 
would find a given measure useful for what types of decisions. Second, ask what 
types of decisions are being made and what data would best support them. 
We recommend you map these relationships and document them as part of 
the basis for measurement. Maintaining process discipline is important. Once the 






suggests that when action X occurs, outcome Y results, then that should be 
confirmed with experiments, tests or simulations. This is particularly important when 
action X is the addition or subtraction of resources.
It is a common belief that more money will buy more readiness. Building and 
testing such causal maps will reveal measures that are truly sensitive to changes in 
financial resources. It is very likely that some measures will not improve solely based 
on additional funding, whereas other measures may improve markedly. Studying the 
variances in spending patterns against variances in performance will help identify 
where the allocation financial resources has the greatest effect as oppose to the 
allocation of other resources (e.g., labor, equipment, management attention, or 
training). For example, the field of education has not definitively demonstrated that 
more money results in better education – that causal relationship is unproven – but 
other factors such as parental involvement or student:teacher ratios are effective. 
Figure 10 on page 28 is an example of such a mapping of causal relationships.  
Just as the redline effort was worthwhile for understanding minimally 
acceptable levels of readiness, a “greenline” or “gold star” effort could help 
determine the factors that yield excellence. Redline efforts help the mediocre unit 
avoid failure, but will not necessarily yield information to push them to greatness. At 
least as much attention should be paid studying the ships at the other end of the bell 
curve – the top performers – to gain insights that can help improve all the units.18
Finally, we recommend the enterprise consider how measures could be 
gamed or manipulated to ill effect and then establish countermeasures or controls to 
prevent that from occurring. To illustrate, we heard from a former commanding 
officer that mandatory jobs during an availability period had an MFOM value of 100 
assigned to them. The ship scored a zero until the job was completed. While this 
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may effectively motivate the ship to perform that job, it does so by perverting an 
evaluation measure into a control measure. The value of MFOM as an accurate 
portrayal of the state of the ship is now lost. Rather than distort the meaning of 
MFOM, a different control device should be used for mandatory jobs. Such a device 
could be as simple as a checklist. 
Additional Information 
 Analyzing Outcome Information: Getting The Most From Data by The 
Urban Institute
 “Why Measure Performance?” by Bob Behn, appears in Public 
Administration Review.
 Public Productivity Handbook by Mark Holzer.
 Governance and Performance: New Perspectives by Carolyn J. 
Heinrich & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. 
Finding 4: Manage data quality, particularly cost data 
Description.
In many instances, scores are presented to the nearest tenth of a point on a 
0-100 scale. One can see that in Figure 9. Is the SWE confident that they have the 
fidelity of data to track a ship to 1/1000th of a unit of measure?  Conversations with 
members of the enterprise and limitations acknowledged by the enterprise suggest 
that the answer is clearly no.
We heard several reports and saw evidence of data quality issues. Some 
databases suffered from empty fields; maintenance jobs with multiple job control 
numbers had costs and efforts misallocated; or data did not accurately cross-
reference with related systems. When asked about maintenance cost estimating, we 
were told the standard for accuracy was +/- 40 percent. None of these issues is 







Looking specifically at financial resources, we noted that obligations were 
normally used as a proxy for cost. As noted earlier, costs are borne when resources 
are consumed in the activities of converting inputs to outputs. That is, cost is the 
consumption of inputs. An obligation, on the other hand, is the legal status of an 
appropriation and often occurs weeks or months before costs are actually borne, 
particularly in the areas of maintenance and supply where parts have a procurement 
lead time or sit in inventory. Services are obligated in full when contracts are let, but 
costs are borne more uniformly throughout the performance period. Other costs, 
including significantly large ones like sailors’ salaries, are not considered at all since 
the obligation is centrally managed by the Navy. 
Consequence 
The main consequence of data quality problems is the proverbial “garbage in, 
garbage out” phenomenon. Decision-quality can suffer if it is based on unreliable 
data. The field of medicine uses the term iatrogenics to describe the negative side 
effects of the primary treatment. (We have all heard the warnings in advertisements 
about sudden losses in blood pressure or feelings of dizziness.) Likewise, reliance 
on low quality or poorly selected data can have ill effects on the organization. One 
was described under the last finding: the distorted incentives in stoplight chart 
coding of data. Others include: 
 Tunnel vision: when managers, faced with many different targets, 
choose the ones that are easiest to measure and ignore the rest. 
 Sub-optimization: when managers choose to operate in ways that 
serve their own operation well but damage the performance of the 
overall system. 
 Myopia: when managers focus their efforts on short-term targets at the 
expense of longer-term objectives. 
 Measure fixation: when outcomes are difficult to measure there is a 
natural tendency to overly focus on the measurable outputs rather than 






 Misinterpretation: when the measures are imprecise there may be no 
real difference between the units compared, although this may not be 
obvious from the single-point estimates used
 Gaming: can take many forms, from re-definition to deliberately setting 
low targets to misrepresentation.
 Ossification: when an indicator has lost its purpose, but no one can be 
bothered to revise or remove it.19
Managing cost requires a cost accounting system. Cost accounting is 
different from budgetary (obligation-based) accounting. One cannot find cost 
information in obligation-based accounting systems like STARS; one has to look for 
cost information in databases that track the use of inputs. Obligation-based 
accounting systems generally only provide three pieces of information: budget 
authority available, obligations (promises to pay), and expenditures (actual 
payments). Such systems are designed to support the fiduciary responsibility of 
government financial managers, not the managerial roles for government general 
managers. In contrast, cost-based accounting systems contain information about 
processes or products, the direct inputs to those processes or products, the indirect 
inputs allocated to processes or products, and the amount paid for those inputs. 
Cost-based accounting systems tell you the cost of what you used and, thus, the 
cost of what you accomplished; obligation-based accounting systems only tell you 
the spending authority you had and how much of it you used, but it does not tell you 
what you own or what you did with it. It is critical to note that our recommendation for 
a cost accounting system is in addition to, rather than a replacement for, obligation 
accounting systems which remain necessary for fiduciary purposes.20
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Precision does not infer nor should it substitute for accuracy. Data should be 
rounded to represent the significance of the computation and the uncertainty in the 
data. Little that is done by the enterprise seems to warrant precision to the tenth of a 
percentage. In most cases rounding to the nearest whole number or a quantile of 20 
or 10 is good enough for decision-making. Such rounding would reinforce to 
decision-makers the level of certainty due to incomplete or unreliable data. The more 
uncertainty, the broader the quantiles should be. “Between 80 and 85” may be more 
accurate than 84.3. 
Continue efforts to clean databases to ensure required database fields are 
complete and accurate. Implement monitoring and control systems (or strengthen 
the enforcement of existing ones) for database reliability. The Six Sigma portion of 
Lean Six Sigma is about reducing variability, which requires reliable and consistent 
efficiency measures. 
Navy Enterprise as a whole should coordinate its efforts, and – more 
importantly – communicate its information requirements, to those who are managing 
the accounting reforms in the Department of the Navy. The Navy’s Financial 
Improvement Program, the DoN component of DoD’s Financial Improvement and 
Audit Readiness effort should be a partner with Navy Enterprise to ensure 
managerially meaningful accounting data is generated by improved accounting 
systems.  Navy ERP, a program of record that is deploying improved enterprise-wide 
accounting functionality should also partner with Navy Enterprise to ensure this 
multi-billion dollar investment provides the information most needed by readiness 
and provider enterprise leadership. Ad hoc efforts such as the common cost 
management framework should be abandoned and the efforts instead put toward 
long-term, systemic improvement. 
Finally, when reevaluating measures (see also Finding #3), choose or verify 






 Technical Adequacy – the measure is unique, complete, reliable and 
accurate; the measure accurately captures what you want to know 
about
 Practicality – it is relatively easy and inexpensive to capture this 
measurement
 User Independent – the data describe something that is comparable 
across entities (different ships) or across time (same ship in different 
time periods); it should be sensitive to changes (for budget purposes, 
adding or subtracting funding should cause this measure to move), and 
it is clearly understood by users and/or stakeholders. 
 User Dependent – the measure is relevant to the decision at hand or 
will drive a action when action is needed and it will do so in a timely 
fashion.21
Additional Information 
 “Performance Measures for Budget Justifications: Developing a 
Selection Strategy,” by Gloria Grizzle, appears in Public Productivity 
and Management Review
 Cost Accounting by M. W. Maher & E. B. Deakin 
 How to Lie With Statistics by Darrell Huff and Irving Geis  
Finding 5: Consider employing forward-looking and subjective 
indicators
Description.
One of the criticisms of the ships operations model used for budgeting is that 
it is backward-looking. A future naval force, consisting of different classes of ships, 
operated according to the fleet response plan is not well served by a model that 
describes resource requirements based on old operating models and different 
classes of ships. While it is a common practice to run a descriptive model in reverse 
to project a future trend, it is only valid if the envisioned future is bounded by the 
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range of data used to construct and validate the model. That is not the case with the 
ships operations model.  
As it happens, the model is not a very accurate descriptive tool, let alone a 
predictive one. Several studies have identified deficiencies in the accuracy of the 
model.22 Until such time as a new model is constructed and goes through the 
validation, verification, and accreditation process,23 the model should be augmented 
with other indicators. 
The use of such models appeals to the hyper-rational mindset common within 
the military. It is reinforced by thoughts that unless something can be measured, it 
cannot be managed and the corresponding belief that objective evidence is more 
accurate or valuable or useful than subjective evidence.  Certainly, inputs can be 
measured objectively and outputs can be measured and counted. Outcomes, 
however, are more elusive. As one digs deeper into the measurement of inputs and 
outputs, though, even things as seemingly concrete as cost become subjective as 
decisions must be made on how to allocate indirect costs. If the outcome the SWE 
aims for is warships ready for tasking, how does one allocate the cost of the Naval 
Surface Force staff, for instance?
Other governments have found it very useful to include subjective measures 
within the set of thing they consider. Subjective measures are most often used to 
assess outcomes rather than inputs, activities or outputs. An example from the city 
of Kirkland, Washington is provided in Figure 10. 
                                           
22 Among them are: Hascall, A. M., Matthews, A. M., Gyarmati, M., Gantt, W. K., and Hajdu, Z. 
Analysis of Ship Ops Model’s Accuracy in Predicting U.S. Naval Ship Operating Cost. MBA
Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003.  Kuker, K. L. and Craig D. H. A
Feasibility Study of Relating Surface Ships OPTAR Patterns to their Operating Schedules. Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1998.  Williams, T. D. An Analysis of 
Selected Surface Ship OPTAR Obligations and their Dependency on Operating Schedules and Other 
Factors. Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1987. 






Figure 10: Example of Kirkland, Washington Performance Measures 
We see in this example that the focus of the measurement system is directed 
toward the ultimate outcome of citizens’ feeling of safety.  The boxes at left describe 
what they believe to be one of the causal relationships affecting a feeling of safety, 
the role of the police department. The set of measures at right is hierarchically 
organized and includes input, output and outcome measures over time. One should 
note that not all measures were captured at all times – they have been evolving this 






measurement system is used to support city budgeting, there is not a dollar figure on 
this report. There are, however, efficiency and productivity measures.
Likewise, not all of the SWE processes are purely objective. Where subjective 
analysis and the exercise of judgment were most apparent in the SWE was in 
resource allocation. Whereas a ship’s initial budget operating target (OPTAR) tends 
be derived from a formula, responding to an OPTAR augment request was not. We 
heard repeatedly that such decisions were based on the staff’s knowledge of the 
ship, the ship’s absolute condition and its condition relative to other ships, even the 
credibility of the commander or supply officer. 
Consequence 
Relying too much on backward looking measures may result in suboptimal 
decisions. During times of stability, such strategies are effective for locking in 
support and refining business operations, but the current state of the navy is too 
dynamic and its potential will be retarded by holding to older models and decision 
heuristics. Until such time as new baselines are established and the ability to 
measure capabilities improves, experimenting with additional, atypical measures 
may be appropriate. 
Not everything that is important can be measured. Most married couples 
would like to improve their marriages, but establishing a performance measurement 
system will more likely backfire than help. Knowing when to exercise judgment 
beyond the measures is a sign of individual and organizational maturity.  
Do not expect your PBMS to do too much – as noted in the PBMS section, 
there are factors outside your control that effect the attainment of goals. Figure 11 is 
an example from an award-winning county government performance management 
system that addresses that issue. In their performance system, the government 
clearly states the role it has in affecting the measure while acknowledging the 






systems view of performance: causal relationships are multi-faceted, the manager 
can only control a portion of them, and environmental factors have a significant 
influence.  
Recommendations
We recommend the enterprise consider greater use of subjective measures of 
readiness as part of the performance measurement system. We recommend looking 
at subjective measures that are indicative of command leadership or unit attitudes 
that will likely result in higher future readiness. This could be empirically tested by 
comparing subjective measures in time T with readiness evaluations in time T+1. 
Potential forward-looking subjective measures include: 
 Command climate surveys  
 Individual award winners such as the Stockdale Award for 
commanding officer leadership 
 Peer rankings within class squadrons 






Figure 11: Example from King County, Washington 






The enterprise should evaluate the factors that affect subjective decision-
making like the OPTAR augment request. If there are elements of those decisions 
that are measurable, consider adding them to your performance system. Where they 
are not, for the benefit of organizational learning those factors should still be 
recorded as part of the process. 
Subjective measures are not only useful as leading indicators; they may also 
be useful lagging indicators.  There are subjective indicators of high levels of 
readiness that the enterprise may be able to back-cast to more objective measures 
to test the efficacy of the objective measures. These include, for example:
 Award winning units: Battle “E” (or component “E”s), meritorious unit 
commendations, golden anchor awards.
 Ships singled out by fleet commanders or joint maritime component 
commanders for their readiness or effectiveness 
There are few direct causal relationships in the public sector and 
understanding all the factors that lead to a given outcome takes considerable effort. 
Systems respond in many ways to any given stimulus and rarely does a single 
stimulus result in the desired outcome. Systems that are too narrowly designed or 
project too clear a hierarchy may lead decision-makers or stakeholders to expect 
more certain outcomes than are realistically possible. Expectations should be set 
that reflect the complexity of the system. The goal of Finding #3 was to improve the 
quality of the measures. The goal here is similar, but focuses less on the individual 
measures and more on the system of measurement. Displays of information and 
supporting documentation should portray fully coherent system, a clearly articulated 
understanding of the causal relationships between the lower order measures and the 
higher order outcomes. 
When refining the measures, we recommend the SWE mine its intrinsic 
knowledge of a ready ship. Every former CO can walk aboard a ship and in about 20 






What heuristics are in her/his head?  Can that be captured in data?  Knowledge 
needs to be intrinsic to be actionable, thus organizational learning occurs when 
intrinsic knowledge in one part of the organization is made extrinsic (converted to 
information); it moves to another part of the organization where it is then internalized 
by others. This is closely related to the recommendations in finding #3 regarding 
evaluating measures. 
We offer a caveat regarding the use of subjective measures. Studies show 
that policy decision-makers prefer subjective measures because they are more 
directly related to the desired outcomes of the organization than its inputs or outputs. 
It would be very appropriate to use subjective measures when employing political 
influence strategies (see Finding #1). Studies also suggest that subjective measures 
are not effective for resource allocation purposes. Resources are more properly 
allocated through the use of objective input and output measures.
Additional Information 
 “Public Officials' Attitudes toward Subjective Performance Measures” 
by Xiaohu Wang and Gerasimos A. Gianakis in Public Productivity & 
Management Review
 King County, Washington 2008 AIM High Report: Annual Indicators 
and Measures. 
 City of Kirkland, Washington Performance Measures, 2007 






Appendix 1: Summary of Recommendations 
Finding 1: Balance political and rational means to your ends 
Continue to apply influence strategies to the political/budgeting world and apply 
economic strategies to the rational world. (p. 17) 
Influence strategies should include external validations of enterprise efforts, 
information from the decision-makers’ staffs, and relate personally to the decision-
maker. (p. 17) 
Finding 2: Extend process discipline to communications 
Persist in using a disciplined process for data collection. (p. 18) 
Efficiency-seeking efforts should focus on inputs and outputs more than funding 
levels. (p. 19) 
When communicating the success or challenges of the enterprise in a budgeting 
environment, be certain to separate the two effects: price concerns and 
programmatic needs. (p. 19) 
Finding 3: Evaluate the effectiveness of the measures 
Shift attention from generating measures to the usefulness and quality of the 
measures (p. 23) 
       Map relationships between measures and desired outcomes to identify causal 
relationships 
       Test the causal relationships for those sensitive to changes in funding 
       Evaluate from data to decision and from decision to data 
Consider a “greenline” effort to identify factors that lead to excellence (p. 24) 
Consider how measures could be gamed and establish countermeasures or controls 
(p. 24) 
Finding 4: Manage data quality, particularly cost data 
Round data to represent the significance of the computation and the uncertainty in 
the data. (p. 26) 
Continue efforts to clean databases to ensure required database fields are complete 
and accurate. (p. 26) 
Ensure data meet criteria for technical adequacy, practicality and user needs. (p. 26) 
Coordinate efforts, and communicate information requirements, to those managing 






Finding 5: Consider employing forward-looking and subjective indicators 
Document how experience and judgment augment the measures. (p. 31) 
Consider greater use of subjective measures when they are forward-looking. (p. 29) 
Mine your intrinsic knowledge of a ready ship and make it explicit. (p. 31) 






Appendix 2: Additional Information  
Books and Articles: 
 Analyzing Outcome Information: Getting The Most From Data by The 
Urban Institute
 Creating Public Value by Mark Moore
 The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective by J. Pfeffer & G. R. Salancik 
 Governance and Performance: New Perspectives by Carolyn J. 
Heinrich & Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. 
 How to Lie With Statistics by Darrell Huff and Irving Geis  
 Linking Performance and Budgeting: Opportunities in the Federal 
Budget Process by Philip Joyce, IBM Center for the Business of 
Government, October 2003. 
 “Linking Performance to Funding Decisions: What is the Budgeter’s 
Role?” by Gloria Grizzle, in Public Productivity and Management 
Review.
 Measuring Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations by 
Theodore H. Poister 
 Performance-based Budgeting by Gerald Miller, W. Bartley Hildreth, 
and Jack Rabin 
 Performance Budgeting: Efforts to Restructure Budgets to Better Align 
Resources with Performance GAO Staff Study (GAO-05-117SP), 
February 2005 
 “Performance Measures for Budget Justifications: Developing a 
Selection Strategy,” by Gloria Grizzle, in Public Productivity and 
Management Review







 “Public Officials' Attitudes toward Subjective Performance Measures” 
by Xiaohu Wang and Gerasimos A. Gianakis in Public Productivity & 
Management Review
 Public Productivity Handbook by Mark Holzer.
 Quicker, Better, Cheaper: Managing Performance in American 
Government, edited by Dall W. Forsythe. 
 “Why Measure Performance?” by Bob Behn, appears in Public 
Administration Review.
Web-based resources:
 American Association for Budget and Program Analysis 
(http://www.aabpa.org)  contains resources for federal, state and local 
government managers and analysts, corporate executives and 
academic specialists involved in public budgeting and program 
analysis 
 Association of Government Accountants (http://www.agacgfm.org)
professional association with an active performance management 
educational program 
 Government Results Center (http://govresultscenter.org)
communicates information on best practices in the federal government 
related to performance management and planning 
 Information Aesthetics (http://infosthetics.com/)  contains innovative 
ways to display data in forms that communicate richer information than 
is available in the standard PowerPoint options. 
 The National Center for Public Performance (NCPP) 
(http://www.ncpp.us/) a research and public service organization 
devoted to improving productivity in the public sector. 
 The Performance Institute (http://www.performanceweb.org/) a think 
tank dedicated to performance measurement in government 
 The Public Performance Measurement & Reporting Network 
(http://ppmrn.rutgers.edu/Home.aspx ) promotes the use of valid, 








 City of Baltimore CitiStat program (other cities have adopted their own 
CitiStat programs, but Baltimore is credited with being the leader) 
(http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/citistat/index.php)
 City of Kirkland, Washington Performance Measures, 2007 
(http://www.ci.kirkland.wa.us/depart/CMO/PerformanceMeasures.htm)
 City of New York, CompStat program (like CitiStat, CompStat has been 
adopted and refined by many other cities) 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CompStat)
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RECENT RESEARCH PRODUCTS OF THE CENTER 
FOR DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REFORM 
 A Comparative History of Department of Defense Management 
Reform, 1947-2006
 Federal Financial Reform: Policy Formulation to Implementation
 Civil Service Reform as National Security: The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 
 Rethinking Acquisition Reform: Cost-Growth Solutions May Aggravate 
More Important Problems
 National Security Personnel System: A History of Enactment of the 
Legislation Authorizing Its Establishment 
 Transformation in Transition: Defense Management Reform and the 
2008 Election 
 Emulating Excellence: Financial Management Lessons from the 
Experiences of the Corporation for National and Community Service 
 Examination of Success Factors in Getting and Sustaining Clean Audit 
Opinions within DoD Components  
 Business Management Reform in the Department of Defense in 
Anticipation of Declining Budgets  
 Benchmarking Best Practices in Transformation for Sea Enterprise  
Copies of the Center for Defense Management Reform Research Reports may be 






THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
`ÉåíÉê=Ñçê=ÇÉÑÉåëÉ=ã~å~ÖÉãÉåí=êÉÑçêã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.defensereform.org
